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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff and Appellee,

]

vs.

]

CORTNEY CORWELL,
Defendant and Appellant.

])

Case No. 960245-CA

])

Priority No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by
provision of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f).
NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with two misdemeanor counts of receiving stolen
property in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 (1993) (R 12-13). She was tried by
a jury which returned a verdict of guilty on one count and acquitted the defendant of
the offense charged in the second count (R 78-79). The defendant was sentenced to pay
a fine in the amount of $150. Payment of the fine was suspended upon condition that
defendant comply with the terms of a court order entered in an unrelated controlled
substance conviction (R 85-87, 92-94). Defendant appeals the judgment, sentence, and
order of probation (R 88).
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The following issues are presented by this appeal. Each is accompanied
by a citation to the record which demonstrates that the issue was preserved in the trial
court.
1. Does the evidence support the verdict and judgment of conviction? (R
211-12).
2. Did the district court err in refusing to give defendant's proposed
specific intent instruction? ($220-24).
3. Does the prosecutor's comment regarding defendant's failing to testify
require reversal? (No contemporaneous objection).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-408 is set out in the Addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In the fall of 1994, Mr. and Mrs. Elsberry rented their St. George
condominium to the defendant, Cortney Corwell, and her sister, Cassie (R 151-52;
Exhibit No. 1). Cassie was 22 at the time and the defendant was 18 (R 160-63, 201-02).
Corwells apparently moved out of the apartment on December 31,1994 (R 164-65, 21819).
Elsberrys came to St. George on or about January 13 or 14, 1995 (R 15456, 163-64). They discovered that the Corwell sisters were no longer residing in the
condominium (R 154).1 As Elsberrys approached the property Mrs. Elsberry saw four

There was evidence indicating that Elsberrys had in fact given Corwells notice requiring them to vacate
the premises by December 31, 1994. See R 216.
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of their pillows in a Nisson hatchback which was parked a little more than 15 feet from
the rental unit (R 156, 171). The pillows were in plain view (R 156, 172, 177).
The automobile belonged to the defendant and was obviously inoperable
(R 172, 178, 181, 205-206). Apparently, it had not been driven for some time and
remained in the same location from the time Elsberrys observed it on January 13 or 14
until at least March 7 (R 183, 189),
After inspecting the condominium, Elsberrys contacted the St. George City
police and reported theft of several items of personal property. Elsberrys' complaint
was assigned to Officer Bill Matthews on January 14, 1995 (R 178). Matthews took
photographs of the defendant's car on January 20 (R 177) and acquired a warrant to
search the car on February 1 (R 178). Nothing other than the fpur pillows which were
clearly visible from outside of the vehicle were recovered in connection with the
execution of the search warrant (R 10-11). This evidence provided the basis of the
offense alleged in Count I of the Information.
When Matthews interviewed the defendant she denied taking Elsberrys'
property out of the condominium and denied that she had possession of their property
(R 180). According to Matthews, the defendant indicated that there were "a lot of
people helping them move" and conceded that one of these individuals may have moved
or misplaced some items (R 180).
On March 7, 1995, defendant again met with police officers.2 At that
time, she mentioned some "silverware and other utensils - other utensils in boxes in her
car" (R 184). Officer Scott Staley requested permission to re-examine the contents of

Defendant's sister was not reinterviewed because she had moved to Jackson Hole, Wyoming (R 200).
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defendant's automobile.

Defendant consented (R 185-86). The vehicle was still

inoperable and parked outside Elsberrys, condominium (R 185,205-06). Staley's search
produced nothing which belonged to Elsberrys (R 185-86). However, later that day
during a consent search of a storage unit which the defendant's sister had rented,
officers found a framed print which they and the defendant assumed had been taken
from Elsberrys' condominium. It was located in a chest of drawers which belonged to
the defendant (R 207-08). This print was the subject matter of the offense alleged in
Count II of the Information.
When the state rested without presenting evidence of the ownership of the
print and without presenting evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer that
the defendant intended to deprive Elsberrys of the pillows, defendant moved to dismiss
both counts (R 211-12). The motion was overruled and both counts were submitted to
the jury.
Defendant was acquitted of the theft of the print and convicted of theft
by receiving the pillows.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The facts and circumstances of defendant's "possession11 of the subject
property will not reasonably support an inference that she intended or acted with a
purpose to deprive the owners of their property. Moreover, the court's instructions did
not make it clear that this specific intent was an element of the charged offense.
Finally, defendant was prejudice by the prosecutor's comments on
defendant's "failure" to testify in her own behalf.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE VERDICT AND JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION ARE
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
The evidence offered in support of defendant's conviction can be
summarized as follows: After the defendant and her sister moved out of Elsberrys'
condominium, four pillows which belonged to Elsberrys and which had been used m
furnishing the condominium were found in plain view in the hatchback of defendant's
car. That vehicle was apparently inoperable at all times relevant to this prosecution.
It was parked in the lot, a little more than 15 feet from the rental unit. There was no
proof that the defendant placed the pillows in the car, that she ever removed them from
the condominium complex, that she ever handled or used them, or that she attempted
to conceal them.
The elements of the alleged offense, in the context of the facts presented
in this case, include: (1) that defendant obtained possession of property of another; (2)
that defendant knew the property had been stolen or believed that it probably had been
stolen; and (3) that defendant acted purposely to withhold the property permanently or
for so extended a period that a substantial portion of use and benefit thereof would be
lost. See State v. Murphv. 617 P.2d 399, 401 (Utah 1980). Cf. Utah Code Ann. §76-6401(3)(a).
Murphy is instructive on several levels. In that case as in the instant case,
the subject property was not damaged or disposed of under circumstances that would
make it unlikely that the owners would recover it. Murphy, the defendant drove the
subject motor vehicle for one evening and left it parked "in plain view" at 400 North 800
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West, in Cedar City, Utah. The owners' address was shown on the registration and
certificate of title as "800 West 400 North 1156," which was apparently a space in a trailer
park located at that intersection. Id. at 401.
Justice Maughan's lead opinion focused on the specific intent element of
the offense of theft by receiving.
The state's representation that the elements of the crime are
merely two-fold, i.e., (1) receiving or disposing of the property, and
(2) knowledge the property was stolen, evidences a fundamental
misunderstanding of the statue and the very essence of the
culpable activity. This general misunderstanding of the nature and
scope of the crime must be remedied by this Court.

Implicit in the language of the statute are the basic elements of the
crime: (1) property belonging to another has been stolen; (2) the
defendant received, retained or disposed of the stolen property; (3)
at the time of receiving, retaining or disposing of the property the
defendant knew or believed the property was stolen; and (4) the
defendant acted purposely to deprive the owner of the possession
of the property. Before the defendant can be convicted of the
crime of receiving stolen property the prosecution must present a
quantum of evidence sufficient to establish each element of the
crime.
Id. at 401-402 (footnotes omitted).
In concluding that the state had failed to make a prima facie case, Justice
Maughan noted that because proof of Murphy's intent was based exclusively on
circumstance, "facts relating to the ownership, location and condition of the van become
important." Id. at 403, n. 11. Applying the law to those facts, Justice Maughan wrote:
In the present case, the prosecution has failed to introduce any
evidence either circumstantial or direct to establish and prove an
unlawful purpose at the time of the defendant's possession of the
vehicle. Under the evidence presented at trial, the defendant
drove the vehicle for one evening and then parked it at the
address of the registered owners. He did nothing to alter its
appearance, impair its future usefulness to the owners or reduce
6

its subsequent economic value. The defendant requested no
reward or other compensation for its return and did not dispose of
it under circumstances that would make it unlikely the owners
would recover it.
Id. at 402-03 (footnotes omitted).
The supreme court concluded that the evidence would not support a
finding that Murphy acted purposely to deprive the owners of their property and
therefore "the very essence of the culpable activity" underlying the commission of the
charged offense had not been established.
In the case before the court, the subject property apparently never left the
condominium complex. It remained in the parking lot, a little more than 15 feet from
the rental unit, in plain view of any person approaching Elsberrys' condominium.
Indeed, Elsberrys observed the pillows in the hatchback of defendant's inoperable car
the first time they returned to the condominium after Corwells had vacated the
premises. The observations which the supreme court made concerning the vehicle which
was the subject matter of the Murphy prosecution apply as well to the property which
is the subject matter of the instant case. Moreover, unlike Murphy who made some use
of the subject property, there is no evidence that the defendant here placed the pillows
in the car, made any use of them, and in any way "acted purposely" to deprive the
owners of their property.
Instead of presenting any evidence of defendant's intent to deprive, the
state resisted instructions which would have clearly informed the jury of the specific
intent element of the subject offense and argued that because the defendant "took
responsibility for the safekeeping of [Elsberrys'] property" (R 226), she was guilty
whether or not she took the pillows and put them in the car (R 235), and "whether she
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really wanted the pillows or not" (R 234). The crime was complete in her possession
of another person's property. More specifically, she was worthy of punishment because
ft

[s]he didn't feel that her actions were anywhere wrong, even though she had possession

of somebody else's property" (R 234).
[BY THE STATES PROSECUTOR]: [Defendant had] every
opportunity to look through the belongings that she had control of
in her car, in her storage unit, and infindingthat she had property
belonging to the Elsberrys, bring it back.
R227.
An intent to deprive Elsberrys of their pillows cannot be reasonably
inferred from nothing more than the defendant's failure to take the initiative to take the
pillows from the car back into the condominium. The judgment must be reversed and
the case dismissed.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED SPECIFIC INTENT
INSTRUCTION.
Defendant proposed a specific intent instruction (R 80-81, 220-21) which
was based on the patterned specific intent instruction promulgated by the Federal Bar
Association, Utah Chapter. The state objected to the instruction (R 222-23) and the
court refused to give it (R 220-24).
The absence of a specific intent instruction facilitated the argument
advanced by the state's prosecutor in closing.
[BY THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR]: Ms. Corwell moved into
Mr. and Mrs. Elsberry's home, knowing that the property in the
home did not belong to her, it belonged to Mr. and Mrs. Elsberry.
She, along with her sister, took responsibility for the safekeeping
of that property with a full understanding that when they left the
8

property — when they left the home, the property that did not
belong to her would remain there. That did not happen. You
may be asked to think that this is a childish irresponsibility, it is
not. The Elsberry's were invaded.
Officer Matthews . . . gave Miss Corwell every opportunity to look
through the belongings that she had control of in her car, in her
storage unit, and in finding that she had property belonging to the
Elsberrys, bring it back.

To knowingly and intentionally deprive a person of what is
rightfully there's [sic], no matter how matter how large or no
matter how small. No big deal?

I repeat, this is not a case of childish irresponsibility, Ms. Corwell
knowingly and intentionally deprived Elsberrys of their property.
Now, whether she really wanted the pillows or not doesn't matter.
She didn't give them back, because she didn't feel guilty. She
didn't feel guilty. She didn't feel that her actions were anywhere
wrong, even though she had possession of somebody else's
property. Property that was only recovered by the police, not
because she brought them back.

Her taking of the items and putting them in her car is not a
necessary element of this crime. What she did requires a finding
of guilt, whether she put them in there, or her sister put them in
there. She knew from the beginning that she had some stuff; her
sister had some stuff.
R 226-28, 234-35.
The law-trained may well view the foregoing as a clear reference to the
element of specific intent and the prosecutor's contention that the state had carried its
burden of proving that the defendant acted purposely to deprive Elsberrys of their
property. However, the argument suggests that having undertaken the "responsibility
for the safekeeping of [Elsberrys'] property," the defendant was guilty when she failed
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to take affirmative action to restore the property regardless of her intent in acting or in
failing to act.
While a jury box full of lawyers may have been able to glean the specific
intent element of the offense from the instructions which were given, the layman who
has no background in the principles of the criminal law and the common law distinction
between larceny and trespass to chattels may have easily been lead to believe that, if the
defendant failed to act promptly to restore the pillows to Elsberrys once she knew they
had been placed in her car, the specific intent would be made out.
In State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court
reversed the defendant's conviction because the jury instructions "failed to explain
adequately the distinction between general and specific intent requirements or relate
those requirements to the facts of the case

" Id. at 78. In concurring in the reversal

of the conviction, Justice Stewart wrote:
Although the instructions used the term "specific intent,1' they did
not define that term. However meaningful that term of art may be
to lawyers, it clearly fails to convey the intended legal meaning to
jurors unless it is carefully and precisely defined. Absent such a
definition, the jury could not possibly find all of the necessary
elements of the crime, especially in view of the defense relied upon
in this case.
Id. at 81.
Defendant respectfully submits that the instructions given in the instant
case did not acquaint the jury with the concept of specific intent. Where an offense by
its very definition requires specific intent, that intent is as much an element of the
offense as the act itself.

10

POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICED BY THE PROSECUTOR'S
MISCONDUCT.
After defense counsel closed, the state's prosecutor made the following
argument in rebuttal:
[BY THE STATE'S PROSECUTOR]: Mr. Pendleton and I could
stand up here and compare war stories about our respective years
and about what we do. I, too, was a defense attorney for many
years, and while in this position now as a prosecutor, I'm not
allowed to comment on whether or not a defendant chooses to
take the stand, what I can tell you is that there are many reasons
why a defense attorney might advise his client to either testify or
not testify.
R 233-34.
The prosecutor not only commented on defendant's silence but invited the
jurors to speculate about the "many reasons why a defense attorney might advise his
client... not to testify" (R 234). This was error. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965).
When such a comment is made before the jury, the potential for prejudice
is manifest. The error requires reversal of the resulting judgment of conviction unless
it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error was harmless. See State v. Eaton,
569 P.2d 1114 (Utah 1977). Only when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming can such
an error be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This is not such a case.
Defendant's failure to draw the district court's and the jury's attention to
the improper comment by making a contemporaneous object does not preclude
appellate review. A criminal defendant does not waive the right to appellate review by
his failure to make contemporaneous objection to the state's improper comment where
the prosecutor's misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error. See Harris v. State.
11

645 P.2d 1036, (Okla.Crim.1982). Typically, improper comment challenges arise in the
context of statements which arguably allude to the defendant's silence but do not directly
comment thereon. The error, if indeed there is any, cannot ordinarily be characterized
as "plain" or "fundamental" where the comment does not clearly direct one attention to
the defendant's silence. Error is fundamental when the prosecutor's comment makes
a direct reference to the defendant's failure to testify. See id., at 1038; State v. Baca.
89 N.M. 204, 549 P.2d 282 (1976)(prosecutor's direct reference to defendant's silence
is reviewable as "plain error").
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that defendant's of
conviction must be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this tj_ day of July, 1996.

Jsd
Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this (1 day of July, 1996, I did personally
deliver two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing document to Marlynn
B. Lema, Deputy Washington County Attorney at 178 North 200 East, St. George, Utah.

Gary W. Pendleton
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ADDENDUM

76-6-408. Receiving stolen property — Duties of pawnbrokers.
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property
of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it probably has
been stolen, or who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen,
intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is presumed in the
case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property stolen on a
separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year preceding the
receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, retained, or disposed,
acquires it for a consideration which he knows is far below its reasonable
value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a pawnbroker or
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting used or
secondhand merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or obtains
property and fails to require the seller or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, that he has the legal rights to sell the
property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right thumb, at the
bottom of the certificate next to his signature; and
(iii) provide at least one other positive form of picture identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business dealing in
or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every
agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to
comply with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed to have
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have been stolen or
unlawfully obtained. This presumption may be rebutted by proof.
(4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears from the evidence
that the defendant was a pawnbroker or a person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal
property, or was an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
person, that the defendant bought, received, concealed, or withheld the
property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2)(d), then
the burden shall be upon the defendant to show that the property bought,
received, or obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap metal processors as
defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or title or lending on
the security of the property;
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buying or selling goods.

